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1. Introduction 
This Chapter analyzes the business responsibility to respect human rights in 
‘complex environments,’ meaning situations where there are widespread or systematic 
gross violations of international human rights law (‘IHRL’) and serious violations of 
international humanitarian law (‘IHL’).1 The leading authority in the field of business and 
human rights (‘BHR’), the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (‘UNGP’ or ‘Guiding Principles’), asserts that all businesses are to respect all 
human rights,2 in all contexts, and at all times.3 To realise this ‘responsibility to respect’, 
businesses should adopt policies and procedures aimed at identifying and mitigating the 
potential and actual risks they pose to human rights, known as ‘human rights due 
diligence.’4 The responsibility to respect is supplemented by a responsibility on businesses 
to remedy harms they cause or contribute to.5  
The UNGP recognizes that ‘[s]ome operational environments, such as conflict-
affected areas, may increase the risks of enterprises being complicit in gross human rights 
abuses committed by other actors’.6 In conflict-affected areas, businesses are advised to 
abide by IHL and to treat the responsibility to respect—normally expressed as social 
expectation—‘as a legal compliance issue.’7 They should engage external experts to ensure 
compliance with both IHRL and IHL.8 This is the only additional and specific guidance 
                                                 
1 The language here is chosen to align with the standards articulated in the United Nations ‘Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,’ U.N. General Assembly Res. 
60/147 (2005). 
2 The UNGP focuses on the Universal Declaration on Human Rights International Bill of Human Rights and 
the International Labor Organization’s core conventions. United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (‘UNGP’), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (2011) at Principle 12, Commentary. 
3 UNGP, Ibid. 
4 Ibid at Principles 11-14 and Commentary.   
5 Ibid at Principle 19, Commentary.  




given for businesses operating in complex environments. The limited engagement with 
complex environments in the UNGP is surprising. Many of the emblematic cases in BHR 
took place in situations with widespread or systematic gross violations of IHRL and serious 
violations of IHL: businesses supplying the Nazis with gas and chemicals used in the 
Holocaust;9 business support for South Africa’s apartheid regime;10 the Nigerian military 
killing Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni leaders critical of Shell;11 and the use of slavery, 
torture, and extrajudicial killings by the Burmese military to construct an oil pipeline for 
Unocal.12 
The framing of the UNGP, and subsequent guidance on its interpretation,13 leaves 
the impression that a business can respect human rights in even the most complex 
environments so long as they engage in sufficient human rights due diligence and 
mitigation efforts.14 In this Chapter, I challenge that assumption. To do so, I invoke the 
findings of transitional justice (‘TJ’) mechanisms that have been entrusted with examining 
liability and pursuing accountability for IHRL and IHL violations in complex 
environments. I introduce TJ more thoroughly in section 3, below, but for now it is 
sufficient to note that TJ commonly refers to a range of processes employed by states 
emerging from conflict or authoritarianism to address past violations of IHRL and IHL.15 
Unlike international criminal law, which focuses on a narrow range of acts committed only 
by natural persons, TJ mechanisms supplement criminal prosecutions with other non-
                                                 
9 See, Carl Krauch and Twenty-Two Others (I.G. Farben Trial), United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 
14 August 1947 – 29 July 1948, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. X (1949) at 52.    
10 See, e.g., In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F.Supp.2d 229 (S.D.N.Y 2009 at 283.  
11 See, Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
12 See, Doe v. Unocal Corporation, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Circuit, 2002).  
13 See, OHCHR, ‘Response to Request from BankTrack for advice Regarding the Application of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in the Context of the Banking Sector,’  (June 2017), 
available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/InterpretationGuidingPrinciples.pdf (last 
accessed 20 July 2019) at 4, 5. 
14  For a similar conclusion on the UNGP approach, see, Geneviève Paul and Judith Schönsteiner, 
‘Transitional Justice and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,’ in Sabine Michalowski 
(ed), Corporate Accountability in the Context of Transitional Justice (Routledge 2013) 74 at 84. 
15 Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice (2010) (‘SG 
Guidance Note’), available at 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf (accessed 31 July 2018). 
See, also, Clara Sandoval, Leonardo Filippini and Roberto Vida, ‘Linking Transitional Justice and Corporate 
Accountability’ in Michalowski (n 15) 9 at 10-12. A unified theory of TJ is, however, difficult and there are 
competing explanations for the purpose and nature of TJ. Pablo de Greiff, ‘Theorizing Transitional Justice,’ 
in Melissa W. Williams, Rosemary Nagy, and Jon Elster (eds.), Transitional Justice (NYU Press 2012) 31 at 
32; see also, generally, Susanne Buckley-Zistel, et al., Transnational Justice Theories (Routledge 2014). 
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judicial mechanisms.16 These mechanisms sometimes (but not always) review the full 
range of IHRL violations.17 Several TJ mechanisms have addressed the responsibility of 
businesses and business leaders for IHRL and IHL violations.18 Their findings point to the 
potential limitations of the UNGP in complex environments by suggesting that certain 
contexts make it impossible for a business to respect human rights.  
While there is growing literature on the relationship between TJ and BHR,19 to date 
scholarship has primarily considered how BHR can be included in or inform the remit of 
TJ. The literature has not yet considered how TJ might challenge the UNGP approach to 
complex environments. It is important to debate the issue of complex environments now, 
during what is still the early stage of international and national efforts at implementing the 
UNGP. There is significant, but limited, national legislation implementing the UNGPs.20 
The UN Human Rights Council is currently developing and debating the scope and 
demands of a binding international treaty on business and human rights.21 These efforts 
                                                 
16 See, See, Diane F. Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with Local 
Agency, 1 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 10 (2007). 
17 For an examination of why economic, social and cultural rights have often been neglected in this area, see, 
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Why was the Economic Dimension Missing for So Long in Transitional Justice? An 
Exploratory Essay,’ in Horacio Verbitsky and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky (ed.), The Economic Accomplices to 
the Argentina Dictatorship: Outstanding Debts (Cambridge 2015). 
18 For an extensive examination of the findings by TJ mechanisms, see, Pax, ‘Everyone’s Business: Corporate 
Accountability in Transitional Justice: Lessons for Colombia’ (2017), available at 
https://www.dejusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/PAX_COL_PZ_BIZ_FINAL_WEB.pdf?x54537   
(last accessed 15 June 2018). 
19 See, e.g., Michalowski (n 15); Verbitsky and Bohoslavsky (n 17); Tara L Van Ho, ‘Is it Already Too Late 
for Colombia’s Land Restitution Process?’ (2016) 5 International Human Rights Law Review 60-85; Leigh 
A. Payne and Gabriel Pereira, ‘Corporate Complicity in International Human Rights Violations,’ (2016) 12 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 63; Sabine Michalowski, ‘No Complicity Liability for Funding 
Gross Human Rights Violations?’ (2012) 30 Berkeley Journal of International Law 451; Nadia Bernaz, 
‘Establishing Liability for Financial Complicity in International Crimes,’ in Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and 
Jernej Letnar Cernic (eds.), Making Sovereign Financing and Human Rights Work (Hart 2014) 61; Paloma 
Muñoz Quick, ‘Buscando la reconciliación: Planes de Acción para lograr la transición,’ in Derechos 
Humanos y Empresas: Reflexiones desde América Latina (Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 
2017) at 313. 
20 For an overview of existing standards and national efforts at new standards, see, Business and Human 
Rights Resource Centre, ‘Mandatory Due Diligence,’ available at https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/mandatory-due-diligence (last accessed 20 July 2019); Business & Human Rights in 
Law, ‘Mapping Key Developments,’ available at http://www.bhrinlaw.org/key-developments (last accessed 
20 July 2019).  
21 Compare: ‘Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,’ Zero Draft (16 July 2018), available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf (accessed 




make it necessary to understand the limitations of the soft-law Guiding Principles so that 
subsequent hard-law implementation efforts can better respond to these challenges.   
In this Chapter, I review the expectations set out in the UNGP and authoritative 
guidance before discussing scholarship that suggests human rights due diligence is simply 
not enough in certain complex environments. I then scrutinize some of the most pertinent 
findings in TJ. In analysing the lessons from TJ, I argue that the overarching context of a 
complex environment may make it impossible for a business to comply with its 
responsibility to respect. In such circumstances, the only means to realise the responsibility 
is to leave the context fully. This presents a challenge for BHR as generally only foreign 
companies would have the luxury of leaving a context. This might call for the re-
consideration of another assumption within BHR: that the UNGP apply equally to all 
businesses at all times. 
2. The UNGP and Complex Environments 
The UNGP’s tripartite approach to BHR is well-known to readers of this volume: 
states are to protect human rights, meaning to regulate and respond to threats by businesses 
and other third party actors; businesses are to respect human rights; and both businesses 
and states are to ensure victims have access to effective remedies when businesses do 
negatively impact on human rights. 22  In a complex environment, the widespread or 
systematic violations of IHRL and IHL indicate that a state is either unable or unwilling to 
meet its duty to protect. Operating independently of the state’s duty to protect,23  the 
business responsibilities to respect and remedy become even more important in these 
environments. This section examines these responsibilities before considering why 
‘complex environments’ raise a concern about the framing of these responsibilities.  
2.1. The Responsibility to Respect  
At times presented as merely requiring that businesses ‘do no harm’, the 
responsibility to respect has both negative and positive elements to it. Businesses must not 
                                                 
22 UNGP (n 2). 
23 Ibid at Principle 11, Commentary. 
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interfere in the realisation or enjoyment of human rights.24 To do this they must establish 
and undertake human rights due diligence to identify and mitigate actual and potential risks 
they pose, and communicate the outcome to affected stakeholders.25  Businesses are to 
undertake human rights due diligence ‘regardless of their size, sector, operational context, 
ownership and structure,’ although some of these factors can affect the scope of the 
process.26 Where practicalities require a business to set priorities, the business should, at a 
minimum, focus on any ‘severe’ impacts it causes, contributes to, or is directly linked to.27 
As noted above, the UNGP recognize that businesses in conflict-affected areas should treat 
the responsibility to respect as a ‘legal compliance issue,’ and use external experts to ensure 
they abide by both IHRL and IHL standards.28 The UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (‘OHCHR’) indicates that in certain circumstances the balance of factors 
can require a business to terminate a relationship with another actor in order to meet its 
responsibility to respect.29  
2.2. The Responsibility to Remedy and the ‘Participation Terms’  
The business responsibilities to respect and remedy are interlinked, and the exact 
relationship between them is delicate. As the author of the UNGP John Ruggie has rightly 
argued, a business should undertake human rights due diligence by looking at the impacts 
of its operations, products, services, and relationships. 30  Only after the impacts are 
identified can the business determine its relationship to each harm.31 Where a business 
‘causes’ or ‘contributes to’ a harm, it must mitigate and remediate the harm.32 The UNGP 
do not require a business to violate domestic law,33 and the UNGP suggests a robust 
                                                 
24 Ibid at Principles 11, 14-15 and Commentary. 
25 Ibid at Principles 11, 14-16 and Commentary 
26 Ibid at Principle 14.  
27 Ibid. David Birchall examines the meaning of the UNGP’s choice of ‘impact’ instead of ‘violation’ in ‘Any 
Act, Any Harm, to Anyone: The Transformative Potential of ‘Human Rights Impacts’ under the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights,’ (2019) 1 University of Oxford Human Rights Hub Journal 121. 
28 UNGP (n 2) at Principle 12, Commentary. 
29 OHCHR (n 13) at 7, n 27. 
30 John Ruggie, Letter to Prof. Dr. Noel Nieuwenkamp, Chair of the OECD Working Party on Responsible 




32 UNGP (n 2) at Principle 17, Commentary. 
33 Ibid at Principle 23, Commentary. 
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process might be a mitigating factor when assessing liability, although the process will not 
simply absolve a business of its responsibility to remedy.34  
According to the OHCHR, a business ‘causes’ an impact when its own actions or 
omissions directly lead to a reduction or the elimination of ‘the ability of an individual to 
enjoy his or her human rights’; it ‘contributes’ to an impact where its actions and omissions 
‘either directly alongside other entities or through some outside entity’ lead to the reduced 
enjoyment of a right.35 Where a business is merely ‘directly linked to’ an impact, however, 
it does not owe a responsibility to provide remedies. A business can have a ‘direct link’ 
where it has neither caused nor contributed to the impact but where its products, services, 
operations, or business relationships are ‘directly linked to’ the harm.36 The business can 
choose how to proceed in light of several factors, and may, in certain circumstances, choose 
to use its leverage to affect change in the operations or activities of its business partners 
rather than terminate the relationship.37 In deciding how to proceed, the business should 
consider the strength of its leverage, ‘how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the 
severity of the abuse, and whether terminating the relationship with the entity itself would 
have any adverse human rights consequences.’38 These factors do not carry equal weight. 
The severity of the abuse is the primary consideration.39  
                                                 
34 Ibid at Principle 17, Commentary.  
35 See, OHCHR (n 13) at 4-5. Given their importance, there has been surprisingly little engagement with the 
participation terms. Two pieces describe or apply the participation terms in line with the OHCHR’s guidance: 
Chiara Macchi, Tara Van Ho, Luis Felipe Yanes, ‘Investor Obligations in Occupied Territories: A Report on 
the Norwegian Global Pension Fund – Global’ (2018), available at 
https://www1.essex.ac.uk/ebhr/activities/default.aspx; Rachel Davis, ‘The UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Areas: State Obligations and Business Responsibilities, 
(2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 961. The only other scholarship to date to address the 
participation terms beyond a passing reference are: Robert C. Blitt, ‘Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Charting an Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance,’ 
(2012) 48 Texas International Law Journal 33 at 49; Björn Fasterling and Geert Demuijnck, ‘Human Rights 
in the Void? Due Diligence in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,’ (2013) 116 
Journal of Business Ethics 799 at 809. Both pieces note problems with the terms, but do not engage with 
their meaning or application. David Birchall also has a forthcoming piece addressing the difficulty of 
applying the participation terms. ‘Irremediable Impacts and Unaccountable Contributors: The Possibility of 
a Trust Fund for Victims to Remedy Large-Scale Human Rights Impacts,’ Australian Journal of Human 
Rights (forthcoming) (on file with the author). 
36 OHCHR, ibid, at 6. 
37 UNGP (n 2) at Principle 19, Commentary. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid at Principles 14, 19, Commentary. 
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The ‘cause, contribute, directly linked to’ participation terms indicate when a 
business’s remedial responsibilities are triggered. The provision of remedies is the means 
by which the rights of victims and the responsibilities of businesses are enforced and 
enforceable.40 Consequently, while all businesses are supposed to undertake human rights 
due diligence, it appears that a business fails to respect human rights only when it causes 
or contributes to a harm. The OHCHR has clarified, however, that the participation terms 
sit on a ‘continuum’; a failure to respond appropriately when a business is only ‘directly 
linked to’ a harm can mean that the business moves along the continuum towards or into 
the ‘contributing to’ territory. 41  Ruggie agrees. 42  In comments on the human rights 
responsibilities of banks, he suggests several factors that could move a company along the 
continuum: ‘the extent to which a business enabled, encouraged, or motivated human rights 
harm by another; the extent to which it could or should have known about such harm; and 
the quality of any mitigating steps it has taken to address it.’43 
In addition to the three participation terms—cause, contribute and directly linked 
to—the UNGP introduces notions of ‘legal’ and ‘non-legal’ complicity.44 It is unclear 
whether and exactly how forms of complicity relate to the participation terms, but ‘legal 
complicity’ seems to correspond, at least reasonably, to the two forms of participation for 
which a business owes remediation.45 The use of both sets of terms introduces an element 
of uncertainty, particularly for complex environments. In a 2008 report where he examined 
definitions of complicity, Ruggie concluded that ‘[w]hat constitutes complicity in both 
legal and non-legal terms is not uniform, nor is it static.’46  Drawing on international 
criminal law, he found that ‘mere presence’ should not give rise to legal liability.47 Instead, 
                                                 
40 For more on remedies, see UNGP (n 2) at Principle 25, Commentary.  
41 Ruggie Letter (n 32) at 6-7. 
42 John Ruggie, ‘Comments on the Thun Group of Banks Discussion Paper on the Implications of UN 
Guiding Principles in a Corporate and Investment Banking Context’ (21 February 2017), available at 
https://www.ihrb.org/uploads/submissions/John_Ruggie_Comments_Thun_Banks_Feb_2017.pdf. 
43 Ibid. 
44 UNGP (n 2) at Principle 17, Commentary. 
45 The UNGP brings the two sets of terms together only once: ‘Typically, civil actions can also be based on 
an enterprise’s alleged contribution to a harm.’ Ibid. Yet, he uses international and national criminal law and 
domestic civil claims to define ‘legal complicity,’ suggesting this is the trigger for remedies. 
46  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/16 (2008) 
(‘Complicity Report’) at para 70. 
47 Ibid at para 39. 
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a business is complicit in a crime when it provides a ‘substantial contribution to the crime, 
such as legitimizing or encouraging the crime.’48 The mixture of language he used in the 
UNGP three years later–‘legal complicity in’ and ‘causing’ or ‘contributing to’ a violation–
makes it difficult to ascertain if Ruggie intended for the 2011 UNGP to exclude beneficial 
relationships from the ‘contributing to’ standard. Ruggie’s conclusions on complicity are 
tainted by a limited engagement with legal sources.49 In his 2008 report, he substantively 
engaged only with the findings of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the Second 
World War, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, and with civil cases from the United 
States and the United Kingdom.50 In the report, Ruggie briefly noted the findings of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (‘South African TRC’) on the 
responsibility of businesses that benefitted from apartheid, discussed below.51 Without 
explanation, he concluded that ‘benefiting is a relevant consideration in non-legal 
contexts.’52 Complex environments, however, raise the potential that ‘mere presence’ not 
only adds legitimacy but can foster, entrench, or exacerbate certain IHRL and IHL 
violations.  
Ruggie suggests that a business needs to take active steps to ‘cause’, ‘contribute 
to’, or be ‘complicit in’ a violation, and the UNGPs suggest that the nature of an impact 
might mean that a business needs to terminate a relationship.53 Neither directly address 
when a business should avoid or leave a complex environment because the context itself 
renders compliance with the responsibility to respect impossible. 54  This appears 
intentional. If ‘mere presence’ is insufficient for legal liability, then there is no need to 
discuss the impact of an overarching environment. A business might be able to limit its 
impacts and justify continued operations so long as it manages its relationships. This 
approach is questionable. As Geneviève Paul and Judith Schönsteiner have argued, in 
                                                 
48 Ibid at para 39. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid at paras 49-53. Ruggie mentions other states but only to acknowledge that they recognize corporate 
criminal responsibility for complicity in international crimes. Ibid. 
51 Ibid at para 41. 
52 Ibid. 
53 See, above (n 39-40); Paul and Schönsteiner (n 14) at 84. 
54 Paul and Schönsteiner, ibid. 
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situations with widespread or systematic violations, a business’s ‘mere presence’ might 
entrench, exacerbate, or condone gross or serious violations of IHRL and IHL.55 
 
2.3. The Problem of Complex Environments 
In complex environments, the UNGP even suggest that relational efforts might 
matter more than outcome. Immediately after explaining that ‘all business enterprises have 
the same responsibility to respect human rights wherever they operate’ regardless of the 
context, the official Commentary to the Guiding Principles notes that ‘[w]here the domestic 
context renders it impossible to meet [the] responsibility [to respect] fully, business 
enterprises are expected to respect the principles of internationally recognized human rights 
to the greatest extent possible in the circumstances, and to be able to demonstrate their 
efforts in this regard.’56 Businesses faced with this difficult situation should ensure they do 
not ‘exacerbate the situation.’57  
Relying on a relational approach to the responsibility to respect fails to address the 
significance of the context and the harms in complex environments.58 This approach may 
be appropriate for incidents where the law prohibits full compliance with IHRL, but not 
where the law requires effective participation in gross or serious violations in complex 
environments. To date, the literature on issues of BHR in armed conflicts has principally 
ignored59 or predates the UNGP,60 describes the UNGP approach61 or outlines challenges 
facing particular industries, most notably the security sector, 62  or focuses on how 
businesses can better respect or promote human rights in conflict-affected areas.63 Notably, 
                                                 
55 Ibid at 84. 
56 UNGP (n 2) at Principle 23, Commentary. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 See, Brian Ganson and Achim Wennmann, ‘Business and Conflict in Fragile States,’ (2015) 55 Adelphi 
Series 457-458. DOI: 10.1080/19445571.2015.1189153. 
60 See, e.g., Olga Martin-Ortega, ‘Business and Human Rights in Conflict,’ (2008) 22 Ethics & International 
Affairs 273; Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, ‘Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights 
Abuses,’ (2001) 24 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 339. 
61 See, Davis (n 31). 
62 Alan Bryden and Lucía Hernández, ‘Addressing Security and Human Rights Challenges in Complex 
Environments,’ (2015) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 153.  
63 Daria Davitti, ‘Away from the Spotlight: Foreign investment in the Afghan Extractive Sector and the 
State’s Duty to Protect the Right to Water,’ in Celine Tan and Julio Faundez (eds.), Natural Resources and 
Sustainable Development (2017) 96.  
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Andreas Graf and Andrea Iff call for the integration of ‘conflict-sensitive business practice’ 
with human rights due diligence.64 Graf and Iff recognize that the fluid nature of armed 
conflicts means that once a business enters a conflict-affected area it can ‘unwillingly or 
unknowingly cause or exacerbate conflict and consequentially face new and largely 
unforeseeable human rights risks.’ 65  The instruments developed for ‘conflict-sensitive 
business practice’ can, amongst other benefits, help identify risks and appropriate actions 
for mitigation and redress.66 Yet, Graff and Iff do not explicitly address whether the nature 
of a conflict can render it impossible for a business to respect human rights, nor do they 
question what this reality means for the UNGP’s approach to the business responsibilities 
to respect and remedy. 
The literature on businesses operating in in situations of occupation, which are 
governed by the laws of armed conflict,67 is clearer and more consistent in finding that a 
context can make it impossible for a business to continue operations while respecting 
human rights.68 A recent report by the Essex Business and Human Rights Project (‘EBHR 
Report’), which I co-authored, considers the responsibility of businesses operating in the 
occupied Palestinian territories.69 We concluded that if a business directly engages in war 
crimes, such as unlawfully taking property from Palestinians (pillage), 70  it causes the 
attendant human rights impacts.71 Questions of contribution, however, were more difficult 
and tied to the facts on the ground. We considered the responsibility of those that sell 
equipment known to be, or likely to be, used in home demolitions or the construction of 
                                                 
64 Andreas Graf and Andrea Iff, ‘Respecting Human Rights in Conflict Regions: How to Avoid the ‘Conflict 
Spiral,’ (2017) 2 Business and Human Rights Journal 109. 
65 Ibid at 115.  
66 Ibid at 122-131. 
67 See, e.g., [Geneva] Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 
287 (1949) at article 2. This article is common to all four Geneva Conventions.  
68 See, Macchi, Van Ho and Yanes (n 38); Valentina Azarova, ‘Business and Human Rights in Occupied 
Territory: The UN Database of Business Active in Israel’s Settlements,’ (2018) 3 Business and Human Rights 
Journal 187-209. See, also, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘Database of All 
Business Enterprises Involved in the Activities Detailed in Paragraph 96 of the Report of the Independent 
International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate the Implications of the Israeli Settlements on the Civil, 
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the Palestinian People Throughout the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/37/39 (2018) at para 40.   
69 Macchi, Van Ho and Yanes (n 38). The report focused specifically on the responsibility of institutional 
investors, which are themselves business enterprises. For a more thorough discussion, see, Tara L Van Ho 
and Mohammed K AlShaleel, ‘The Mutual Fund Industry and the Protection of Human Rights,’ (2018) 
Human Rights Law Review 1-29. 
70 For more on pillage, see below (n 128). 
71 Macchi, Van Ho and Yanes (n 38) at 19-20. 
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illegal Israeli settlements.72 The destruction of Palestinian homes in occupied territory 
occurs on a widespread, systematic, and discriminatory basis, and as such constitutes both 
a war crime and a violation of IHRL.73 The construction of Israeli settlements in occupied 
Palestine is illegal under international law, constitutes a war crime, and the settlements are 
widely linked to a myriad of human rights impacts, including, inter alia, the rights to 
property, housing, food, water, free movement, and non-discrimination. 74  While the 
equipment used in the home demolitions and settlement construction can have both 
legitimate and illegitimate purposes, the context and the consistency of the violations 
indicate that the sale of equipment furthers a pattern of abuse such that even if an individual 
sale of a particular piece of equipment does not result in the commission of a war crime, 
the sales collectively facilitate the commission of those crimes. Businesses know or should 
know that they are helping to further the war crimes, and thereby the reduction of human 
rights. Similarly, the Israeli legal system makes it impossible for Israeli banks to withhold 
funding from settlements.75 The financing provides material support for an act that directly 
leads to a reduction in the realization of several human rights. The context means that 
Israeli banks can never meet their own responsibility to respect because they are required 
to routinely contribute to structural and systematic violations of IHRL.76  
These conclusions largely align with those of the United Nations and other scholars 
focused on BHR in occupied Palestine. The UN Human Rights Council called the 
violations associated with the settlements ‘immitigable’ and stated that businesses should, 
inter alia, ‘avoid contributing to the establishment, maintenance, development or 
consolidation of Israeli settlements.’77 OHCHR has concluded that it is ‘difficult to imagine 
a scenario in which a company could engage in’ operations in or routine transactions with 
the settlements ‘in a way that is consistent with the Guiding Principles and international 
law.’78 Valentina Azarova similarly argues that by merely operating in the settlements, 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid at 14-15.  
74 Ibid at 14-20. 
75 Ibid at 20. 
76 Ibid at 25. 
77  UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Resolution, ‘Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,’ UN Doc A/HRC/RES/34/31 (2017).  
78 OHCHR, Database (n 67) at para 41. 
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businesses ‘invariably contribute’ to the establishment and ‘entrenchment’ of settlements 
that constitute, by their nature, violations of IHL and IHRL.79  
One might argue that the issue of settlements can be adequately addressed through 
a relational lens: the business responsibility is triggered because of its relationship to the 
settlements. This might be appropriate for those who sell or transfer equipment for the 
destruction of Palestinian homes or the construction of the settlements. With the banks, 
however, the law requires their contribution to human rights violations. The context, rather 
than their relationships, change what might otherwise seem like passive involvement into 
active and material support for human rights violations. Paul and Schönsteiner are therefore 
right to criticize the UNGP for failing to engage with the unique problems stemming from 
complex environments.80 Here, the findings of TJ mechanisms can be informative. The 
next section considers how TJ mechanisms have addressed businesses’ and business 
leaders’ responsibility for human rights violations in complex environments. 
3. The Findings of Transitional Justice  
This section examines the findings of a select number of TJ mechanisms to consider 
the limits of the UNGP in complex environments. As I explained above, TJ commonly 
refers to the means by which states emerging from conflict or oppressive regimes address 
their histories of widespread and systematic IHRL and IHL abuses.81 There is no single 
approach to TJ. Instead, based on their context, priorities and needs, states employ a 
combination of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms to secure accountability for the past, 
to provide reparations to victims, and to encourage social reconciliation. 82  Common 
mechanisms include truth commissions, judicial prosecutions, reparations programmes, 
and ‘guarantees of non-recurrence,’ meaning institutional, legal, and social reforms aimed 
at ensuring the non-repetition of past abuses.83 Several TJ mechanisms have considered the 
responsibility of businesses and/or business leaders for their role in past violations of IHRL 
                                                 
79 Azarova (n 67) at 195, 198. 
80 Paul and Schönsteiner (n 14) at 71. 
81 See (n 15). 
82 SG Guidance Note (n 15) at 7-10; Sandoval, Filippini and Vidal (n 15) at 10. 
83 See, Orentlicher (n 16). 
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and IHL.84 The benefit of TJ for BHR stems from the fact that in practice its mechanisms 
often reach beyond criminal law. Both TJ and international criminal law have their origins 
in the military tribunals following the Second World War. 85  TJ mechanisms include 
criminal prosecutions, but many of the non-judicial mechanisms engage more thoroughly 
with the whole of IHRL.86 Additionally, non-judicial TJ mechanisms are often entrusted 
with establishing historical and contextual causes of abuse.87 As such, they sometimes 
consider the role played by institutions or segments of society in developing or carrying 
out abuse, and have often address actors who cannot or will not be prosecuted by the state.  
In this section and the next, I consider how TJ can inform the BHR approach to 
complex environments. Scholars researching on the intersection of BHR and TJ generally 
agree the following states’ experiences are the most significant for BHR: Argentina, Brazil, 
Germany, Guatemala, Liberia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Timor Leste.88 A thorough 
analysis of each situation is beyond the scope of this Chapter, and has been undertaken 
elsewhere.89 I focus only on pertinent developments suggestive of the extent to which an 
environment, rather than a relationship, might inform a business’s ability to respect human 
rights. I group the findings under two headings: material support for IHRL and IHL 
violations; and benefitting from violations that the business did not directly participate in. 
This division highlights that BHR’s contextual problems are not limited to ‘beneficial 
relationships,’ although the responsibility for those relationships needs to be better 
understood.  
                                                 
84 For an overview, see, Pax (n 18).  
85 For literature on international criminal law and BHR, see, e.g., Harmen van der Wilt, ‘Corporate Criminal 
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Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, 2nd ed. (Routledge 2011).  
88 See, e.g., Pax (n 18); Michalowski (n 15). 
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3.1. Active Support for IHRL and IHL Violations 
3.1.1. Second World War Cases 
Following the Second World War, Allied States prosecuted business leaders for 
supporting the Holocaust by providing gas and drugs used at the concentration camps, for 
crimes against peace for supporting general war efforts, and for crimes against humanity 
because they benefitted from both illegal confiscations of property for their businesses and 
slave labour made available to them from the concentration camps. 90  The businesses 
themselves were not subject to criminal trial under the presumption that legal entities could 
not be held criminally accountable.91 Businesses identified as a threat to international peace 
were instead punished by being liquidated or put into trusteeship and eventually sold to 
new owners.92 For this Chapter, the international tribunals’ findings on the responsibility 
of individual business leaders are more telling than the dismantling of the businesses 
themselves. 
In the Flick case, the defendants were the principle proprietor and leading officials 
of several related businesses, including mines and steel plants.93 They were each accused 
of taking part in the enslavement of civilians for use in industrial activities aimed at 
benefiting the Reich government’s war efforts.94 Some of the individuals were accused of 
additional crimes, but it is the Tribunal’s approach to the accusations around enslavement 
of civilians that is most telling. On the facts, the Tribunal found that, with one exception, 
the acts of enslavement were required, orchestrated, and monitored by the government.95 
Objecting to the use of enslaved civilians likely would have been ‘construed as sabotage 
and would be treated with summary and severe penalties, sometimes resulting in the 
imposition of death sentences.’96 While the defendants were unable to object to the use of 
                                                 
90 For overviews of the cases, see, Jessberger (n 96).  
91 See, van der Wilt (n 96) at 52-53.  
92 See, Control Council Law No. 9, ‘Providing for the Seizure of Property Owned by I.G. Farbenindustrie 
and the Control Thereof,’ Pub. L. No. I, Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and 
Coordinating Committee, 225 (1945), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/01LAW06.pdf. 
93 Trial of Friedrich Flick and Others, United States Military Tribunal, Case No. 48, Law Reports of Trials 
of War Criminals, Vol. IX (1947). 
94 Ibid. 
95 Flick (n 104) at 7-8.  
96 Ibid at 7.  
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slave labour, the Tribunal found that the conditions at the plant were humane.97 As such, 
the four defendants who took ‘no active steps towards the employment of slave labour and 
… would have been exposed to danger had they in any way objected to or refused to accept 
the employment of the forced labour allocated to them’ could invoke the defence of 
necessity.98 Two of the defendants, however, had actively sought to procure forced labour 
from the government.99 The Tribunal found that these acts ‘were taken not as a result of 
compulsion or fear, but admittedly for the purpose of keeping the plant as near capacity 
production as possible.’100 These two defendants were convicted for participating in the 
enslavement of civilians.101  
In Carl Krauch and Twenty-Two Others, known as the ‘I.G. Farben Trial,’ the 
tribunal similarly allowed those who did not intentionally seek forced labour from the 
government to invoke the defence of necessity.102 On the basis of the same reasoning as 
Flick, those who took an ‘active part in the procurement of such forced labour, fully aware 
of the hardships and sufferings to which such labourers were exposed’ were convicted on 
the charge.103 The 23 Farben defendants faced numerous other charges, of which two more 
are significant for this chapter: supplying poison gas and drugs for use in gas chambers or 
as part of medical trials (discussed here); and plunder and spoliation (discussed below in 
‘benefitting from violations’). On the evidence presented, the Tribunal found that the 
provision of Zyklon-B, a poisonous gas, was ‘actually used in the mass extermination of 
inmates of concentration camps, including Auschwitz.’104 Yet, the defendants did not and 
could not have known how the gas was being used.105 The gas was originally manufactured 
as an insecticide and neither the volume nor the locations for delivery of the gas were 
suspicious in light of the context.106  Similarly, some of the defendants had supported 
trialling typhus medication in the camps, but were unaware that trials were taking place on 
                                                 
97 Ibid at 9. 
98 Ibid at 9, 30. 
99 Ibid at 8. 
100 Ibid at 10. 
101 Ibid at 2, 30. 
102  Krauch (n 9) at 28. 
103 Ibid at 26-28. 
104 Ibid at 24. 
105 Ibid at 23-24. 
106 Ibid at 23-24. 
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concentration camp inmates who had been intentionally infected with typhus.107 When they 
became aware of the conditions of the trials, the defendants stopped sending the drugs to 
the camps.108 The defendants were acquitted of these charges. The Krauch acquittals can 
be easily contrasted with those in Bruno Tesch and Two Others, where the defendants were 
also accused of supplying the Nazi regime with Zyklon-B.109 There, evidence that the 
defendants supplied the gas despite knowing its purpose led to their convictions.110 As 
Sabine Michalowski explains, the difference between the two cases suggests that criminal 
liability arises only where a business voluntarily supplies goods it knows will be used for 
criminal purposes.111 
The Tribunals’ analysis in these cases suggests that the conditions of the Nazi 
regime were such that businesses were required to participate in and contribute to certain 
violations of IHRL as objecting was not only futile but could result in severe punishments. 
Where the overarching legal and political context required the business leaders (and 
thereby the business) to participate in violations, the defendants were acquitted. Where, 
however, defendants went beyond what was required by the situation to knowingly, 
actively, and unnecessarily participate in or provide support for a violation, they bore 
criminal responsibility. The context was no longer a defence because it was not the context 
that dictated the defendants’ conduct. 
3.1.2. Argentina’s truth commission and prosecutions 
Several truth commissions have also identified individual businesses or business 
leaders that actively supported the commission of IHRL and IHL violations.112 The truth 
commissions in Argentina, Brazil, and Guatemala each came to similar conclusions that 
businesses supported the relevant regime’s arrest, detention, or torture of individuals.113  
The Argentinian truth commission’s findings, and the subsequent conviction of business 
leaders by courts, is particularly detailed and instructive.  
                                                 
107 Ibid at 24-25.  
108 Ibid at 25. 
109 Bruno Tesch and Two Others, (1947) 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 93.  
110 Ibid. 
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112 See, generally, Pax (n 18). 
113 Pax (n 18) at 70, 79-81, 96-97. 
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From 1976 to 1983, a series of military juntas undertook widespread and systematic 
violation in the name of protecting and promoting capitalism and capital.114 The military 
considered that labour unions and their leaders posed a threat to the military leadership and 
the capitalist economy.115 At least 9,000 people were enforcedly disappeared or tortured, 
including many union organisers.116 In its 1984 report, Argentina’s National Commission 
on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP), the state’s first truth commission, identified 
11 corporations involved in illegal detentions and enforced disappearances during the 
predecessor military regime.117 The businesses named did not simply benefit from a robust 
military dictatorship; the report suggests they actively sought the military’s support by 
identifying individual labour activists for detention.118 The Commission heard that the 
labour relations manager for the car company Ford stated in a meeting to union delegates 
that ‘the company no longer recognized their status…. At the end of the meeting he said 
mockingly to them, “You’ll be giving my regards to a friend of mine.”’119 Two days later, 
they were subjected to enforced disappearances.120 In 2015, following the revocation of the 
state’s amnesty laws, the Argentinian Ministry of Justice and Human Rights identified 25 
companies it concluded were complicit in enforced disappearances and murders. 121 
Individual leaders within Ford were prosecuted, and two were convicted in December 
2018.122 When determining the culpability of the two, the Court found that the company 
had not simply benefitted but had actively contributed to the identification of workers for 
the military to target, and had provided food, equipment, gasoline, and facilities for a 
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‘clandestine detention centre’ that housed disappeared workers.123 IHRL violations were 
widespread and systematic, but for the Argentinian courts that did not justify the Ford 
employees’ conduct. It was not the context that caused the specific violations, but instead, 
the business leaders took specific acts to facilitate, cause, and contribute to the violations.  
3.2. Benefiting from Violations 
While Ruggie suggests benefitting from human rights violations should not lead to 
legal liability, the findings from TJ suggest the issue is more complicated. Some TJ 
mechanisms have also considered the responsibility of businesses (and business leaders) 
that benefitted from IHRL and IHL violations. Here, I focus on a limited number of TJ 
mechanisms: I return to the Krauch decision before examining findings from South 
Africa’s and Timor-Leste’s truth commissions, and land restitution efforts in Colombia. 
3.2.1. The Krauch decision 
While the Krauch tribunal’s approach to enslavement is discussed above for its 
approach to ‘active support’ for the war crimes relating to enslavement, the court’s 
approach to both enslavement and the war crime of spoliation are also important for 
understanding beneficial relationships. Both sets of charges involved active and passive (or 
beneficial) participation in war crimes that also breached human rights. As noted above, 
the enslavement charges involved both active and passive participation, with criminal 
convictions arising only where a business leader actively sought to secure more slaves from 
the government. 124  All but one of the Krauch defendants were also accused of 
‘spoliation,’125 which refers to the unlawful transferring of property in the context of an 
armed conflict, including from ‘protected persons’ such as civilians in occupied territory.126 
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The Nazi regime had ‘adopted and pursued a general policy of plunder of occupied 
territories,’ and exploited those territories ‘for the German war effort in the most ruthless 
way.’127 As a result, Farben was given property it was not entitled to after the German 
government and military confiscated property in violation of IHL. 128  Similar to its 
approach to enslavement, the Tribunal differentiated between those Farben leaders who 
actively pursued involvement in the crime by seeking preferential treatment from the 
government or lobbying for the spoliation, and those who were merely present during the 
commission of the crime.129 The former were convicted while the latter were acquitted. 
The criminal convictions for spoliation and enslavement both turned on whether 
the defendants took active steps to secure the commission of crimes as opposed to those 
that merely benefitted. As Annika van Baar has rightly stated, ‘[c]orporate involvement in 
international crimes … tends to be mutually beneficial to both the corporation and the 
perpetrators of international crimes,’ although ‘[t]he benefit for the corporation does not 
always involve profits and does not always materialise.’130 At times, the benefit itself may 
be the involvement in the crime, as was the case for various Krauch defendants in regards 
to both participation in enslavement and spoliation. It would be wrong to suggest, however, 
that because the tribunals found the defendants did not incur criminal liability that the 
business itself was not ‘causing’ or ‘contributing to’ crimes, and consequently failing to 
meet the standard now expected by the responsibility to respect. Instead, the cases suggest 
the limits of relying on criminal law convictions or acquittals to interpret and define BHR 
expectations. As Michalowski has pointed out, the convictions and acquittals of individual 
business leaders by the military tribunals turned on whether there was sufficient evidence 
that the individual met both actus reus and mens rea standards for specific crimes.131 Yet, 
as discussed above, the Flick and Krauch tribunals found that the businesses engaged in 
the crime of enslavement – it was directly using slaves – even where individual business 
leaders were not held criminally responsible.  
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With spoliation, the Krauch tribunal noted that it was a German government policy 
to turn over to Germany companies property that was wrongfully taken as part of a war 
crime in order to benefit the German war efforts.132 The Allied Control Council had found 
that I.G. Farben had ‘committed’ property violations, and the tribunal found ‘that these 
offences were connected with, and were an inextricable part of, the German policy for 
occupied countries.’133 What the court did not have cause to address explicitly was that by 
taking control of these properties, even absent any other effort, the German businesses 
were, at a minimum, participating in the war crimes.134  This is common in complex 
environments. Van Baar studied three cases—Nazi Germany, apartheid South Africa, and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo—and  concluded that ‘[i]n all three contexts it was 
hard to do business and not become involved in the commission of international crimes by 
cooperating with the perpetrators of those crimes.’135 As a result, and as is evidenced by 
the finding of criminal responsibility for only some of the business leaders who benefitted 
from the use of slavery or spoliation, business benefitted from serious violations of IHL 
and IHRL while also passively participating in those violations. Applying this reality to the 
framework in the UNGP, this suggests that in some contexts, businesses could not be 
merely ‘linked to’ a violation, but may be required to ‘cause’ or ‘contribute to’ IHRL and 
IHL violations. The context excuses individual criminal responsibility, and may excuse the 
business’s remedial obligations, but the context also means that the business could not 
respect human rights.  
3.2.2. South Africa’s truth commission 
Perhaps the most interesting engagement with the issue of business responsibility 
came from a special three-day hearing by the South African TRC, the main TJ mechanism 
employed following the end of apartheid. 136  In a footnote to his report on forms of 
complicity, Ruggie claims that the South African TRC ‘implied that it would be 
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inappropriate to hold … companies accountable for’ merely benefitting from apartheid.137 
That is too simplistic a depiction to be accurate. The TRC’s mandate sat between that of a 
judicial and non-judicial body as it was tasked with gathering and determining the 
truthfulness of testimonies in order to recommend amnesties, but without the ability to 
convict perpetrators or award reparations.138 It was directed to investigate and create a 
historical record of the ‘causes, nature, and extent of gross violations of human rights’139 
committed during the apartheid era, ‘including the antecedents, circumstances, factors and 
context of such violations.’140 The TRC was to identify ‘all persons, authorities, institutions 
and organizations involved in’ gross human rights violations. 141  This broad mandate 
encompasses the responsibility of legal persons, but the TRC could offer amnesties only to 
natural persons who had rendered ‘a full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to’ their 
participation in gross human rights violations.142  
The TRC mixed moral and legal approaches, routinely employing the words 
‘moral’ and ‘morality’ while also using language that evokes a legal standard, such as the 
finding that certain businesses ‘must be held accountable.’ 143  In its report, the TRC 
encouraged victims of some businesses to pursue civil remedies that the TRC itself could 
not order. 144  This mix of morality and legality is unsurprising: the TRC was led by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu and tasked with helping to shepherd the state from a situation 
in which the law was designed to sanction, protect, and promote systematic violations of 
IHRL to a situation where it was remedying those violations. It struggled to reach 
consensus and was hampered by political maneuvering,145 but in its conclusions, the TRC’s 
differentiated degrees of responsibility move beyond simple social expectations and into 
the territory of legal formation and recognition. Rarely focused on specific businesses, it 
instead primarily addressed industries, establishing three levels of involvement. Third-
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order involvement related to benefitting from apartheid, while ‘first-order’ refers to directly 
formulating oppressive policies or practices and ‘second-order’ involvement included 
financing the regime and selling it products or services with the knowledge they would be 
used for ‘morally unacceptable purposes’ that were lawful only because of the apartheid 
system. 146 Third-order involvement implicated, for example, white business owners were 
given privileged access to land, and consequently, enjoyed structural advantages over non-
white owners.147 They did not (necessarily) actively take part in the development of the 
policies, and instead merely operated within the system of laws.  
In his ‘complicity’ report, Ruggie noted that the TRC found ‘first-order’ 
involvement to be of a ‘different moral order’ from ‘third-order’ involvement.148 He used 
this to dismiss the TRC’s findings as raising ‘non-legal’ complicity.149 The TRC’s findings 
on businesses that ‘benefitted indirectly by virtue of operating within the racially structured 
context’ was more nuanced:  
Condemning such businesses suggests that all who prospered under 
apartheid have something to answer for. … Taken to its logical conclusion, 
this argument would need to extend also to those businesses that bankrolled 
opposition parties and funded resistance movements against apartheid. 
Clearly not all businesses can be tarred with the same brush.150  
A close textual reading suggests the TRC was merely rejecting a blanket application of 
responsibility to all who benefitted from the previous system. This does not mean that some 
of the businesses did not bear some responsibility to provide reparations for merely 
‘benefitting’ from the region. In fact, the contrary is true. Quoting Professor Charles 
Simkins, the report notes that some businesses had attempted to push for reforms, while 
others ‘resisted change.’ 151  The former may have benefitted from the privileges of 
apartheid, but they did not seek or foster the environment necessary to sustain it. 
The Commission also focused firmly on two industries, agriculture and mining. 
White farmers benefitted from privileged access to land and were also given control over 
the ‘living and working conditions, wages, and the lives of black workers and their families 
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living on the farms.’ 152  The forceful displacement of black South Africans from 
commercial farmlands ‘was done, if not at the explicit request of the agricultural sector, 
certainly with its implicit support.’153 Similarly, the mining industry ‘benefitted from’ legal 
systems that allowed for ‘migratory labour and the payment of low wages to black 
employees.’154 It is simply not the case that all businesses that were merely ‘benefitting 
from’ or prospering as a result of apartheid were treated equally by the TRC. The singling 
out of these sectors suggests that the TRC found some beneficial relationships more 
problematic than others.  
 The TRC stopped short of determining criminal responsibility for businesses as it 
was not empowered to order businesses to provide remedies. Instead, it explained the rights 
of victims to redress and issued recommendations about who should contribute to 
reparations efforts. This again led to a mixture of legal and moral conclusions. The TRC 
frames the right of victims to reparations within the context of IHRL’s legal standards,155 
but could only request that businesses contribute to the reparations fund.156 It called on all 
businesses that benefitted from apartheid to contribute to the fund, and indicated that taxes 
and fees on all wealthy businesses and corporations would supplement the donations.157 
Ultimately, the government of Thabo Mbeki rejected the proposal for taxes and fees, and 
instead used a voluntary Business Trust to collect donations.158 The R$1.2 billion (USD 
$78million) collected (from only 140 companies) was then used for collective development 
projects rather than reparations.159 
3.2.3. East Timor’s truth commission 
Several other truth commissions have called on businesses and business leaders to 
contribute to reparations funds as a means of compensating victims of past IHRL and IHL 
abuses,160 but often with less thorough analysis than what appeared in the South African 
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report. Sometimes the call for reparations has been a general one, but at other times, as 
with the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (‘CAVR’) in East Timor, 
particular businesses or industries are identified as having a responsibility to contribute to 
reparations efforts.161 For example, the East Timorese were forced to cultivate coffee but 
did not accrue benefits from the cash crop.162 Coffee plantations were also used as grounds 
for interrogations, torture, and extrajudicial killings.163 CAVR determined specifically that 
the coffee industry should pay reparations, and more broadly recommended that any 
businesses that ‘profited from the sale of weaponry to Indonesia during the occupation … 
and particularly those whose material was used in Timor-Leste [should] contribute to the 
reparations programme for victims of human rights violations.’164 
3.2.4. Colombia’s land restitution   
Finally, Colombia adopted a land restitution process that implicitly addresses 
beneficial relationships.165 Aimed at returning individuals displaced due to the conflict,166 
the Colombian law allows for a burden shifting that presumes certain transactions were 
unlawful because of when and where they occurred or who was involved.167 The law does 
not apply to the whole of Colombia, but targets places and periods of activity where 
forceful land transfers or displacements were common.168 Those who benefitted from land 
transfers by securing land cheaply, including businesses and business leaders, can retain 
their property only if they can show they acted in good faith.169 This requires demonstrating 
not only that they paid for the property but also that they paid a fair market price for the 
property.170 In other words, the businesses that benefitted from widespread displacement 
were presumed to have engaged in wrongdoing and could only retain their property if they 
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could demonstrate they did not, in fact, benefit because they paid what would have been 
demanded from them otherwise.171  
3.4. Conclusions  
As mentioned above, this is not an exhaustive overview of the findings from TJ 
mechanisms. Instead, it focused on those findings that raise particular considerations about 
the way an overarching context can inform the responsibility of businesses and business 
leaders. In the next section, I identify some of the lessons these TJ mechanisms offer BHR.  
4. Lessons for Business and Human Rights  
 The findings from TJ mechanisms discussed above lead me to three conclusions: 
first, BHR needs to better engage with standards from the so-called ‘Global South;’ second, 
TJ offers BHR important opportunities and guidance that international criminal law does 
not and cannot; and third, complex environments offer challenges for BHR that the UNGP 
do not seem capable of tackling. In this section, I discuss each of these issues.  
One lesson that should be apparent from the discussion above, but which deserves 
more attention than can be given in this Chapter, is that the development of the UNGP 
could have benefitted from more engagement with standards emanating from outside the 
UN’s ‘Western Europe and Others’ (‘WEOG’) regional group and from TJ. The foundation 
of the participation terms seems to have been informed primarily by international criminal 
law and US and UK law. The South African TRC’s findings were noted but were not 
engaged with. The portrayal of their findings as merely moral, and not legal, downplays 
their significance, and the failure to engage with other TJ mechanisms (or civil or criminal 
law) from non-WEOG states perhaps contributed to the fact that UNGP fails to raise or 
answer compelling legal questions implicated by the use of the participation terms. 
The second lesson to be drawn is that TJ should play a greater role in BHR 
discussions. To inform the UNGP’s legal standards, Ruggie drew on international criminal 
law, but not TJ. This was a mistake. TJ could have provided clarity for issues that 
                                                 
171 There are additional conditions so that if they made material improvements to the land, the purchaser 
could retain the property. These conditions raise questions about the appropriateness of this approach that are 
beyond the scope of this Chapter.  
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international criminal law is simply ill-suited to address. TJ mechanisms generally apply 
IHRL and some have addressed businesses specifically, whereas no international criminal 
tribunal has had jurisdiction to prosecute businesses for international crimes. 172 
International criminal law is also intentionally narrow, focusing on only a few rights and a 
few types of actions.173 The Flick, Krauch, and Krupp decisions found that businesses 
participated in violations of IHRL and IHL for which no individual business leader could 
be held accountable. Expanding research on international ‘accountability’ mechanisms 
beyond criminal trials, and even beyond judicial measures, can offer BHR new insights 
into the conduct expected of businesses.  
Finally, the TJ findings raise questions about the limits of the UNGP in complex 
environments. The Guiding Principles treat the responsibility of businesses to respond to 
harms caused by others in relational terms: businesses should consider how to mitigate 
harms if they are caused by their business relationships via their operations, products, or 
services.174 When determining how to respond to harms the business is directly linked to, 
it should consider using ‘leverage,’ which is a relational term.175 In doing so, it can consider 
as well as ‘how crucial the relationship is … and whether terminating the relationship’ can 
have adverse impacts.176 But, what if it is not the relationship but the context that is the 
problem?  
As with active support, TJ mechanisms found that a beneficial relationship might 
give rise to a responsibility to provide reparations under the UNGP, but the context might 
require excusing the business’s failure to respect human rights. As such, even where the 
business is passive it can participate in, cause, or contribute to human rights impacts. The 
post-war tribunals indicated German businesses directly undertook violations of IHRL, 
using slaves in their operations or benefitting from spoliation. While the criminal 
responsibility of the business leaders was excused, by the UNGP standards the businesses 
‘caused’ or ‘contributed to’ the violations and should have a responsibility to provide 
                                                 
172 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Appeals Panel has held businesses in contempt of court. See, Nadia 
Bernaz, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability under International Law: The New TV S.A.L. and Akhbar Beirut 
S.A.L. Cases at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 313 
173 See, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90 (1998) at Articles 5-21; for a fuller 
discussion on the differences in regimes, see, Darcy (n 23) at 439-443.  
174 UNGP (n 2) at Principle 19, Commentary.  
175 See, ibid at 14, 19, Commentary. 
176 Ibid (italics added). 
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remedies. The South African TRC seemed to call for a nuanced approach to legal liability, 
suggesting that even certain beneficial relationships can give rise to a remedial 
responsibility.  
Despite this, the TJ mechanisms for Germany, South Africa, and Colombia found 
or were designed around the recognition that the context, not merely a business’s conduct 
or relationships, can impact a business’s responsibility. The courts found the Germany 
business leaders could not avoid participating in war crimes without suffering punishment. 
The South African TRC recognized that all businesses operating in the apartheid context 
were, at least, linked to the human rights harms and incurred a responsibility to contribute 
to reparations, even if their actions did not reach the level of active participation in the 
IHRL violations. Finally, the Colombian law suggests that the context in which a business 
operates can create a presumption of involvement in human rights impacts that can be 
overcome only by a clear showing that the business did not participate in the harms.  
These findings are crucial as it suggests that in certain contexts, the state’s failure 
to respect, protect and fulfill human rights not only allows a business to negatively impact 
on human rights but it actively requires the business to do so. While necessity, duress, or 
similar defenses may justify excusing individual criminal liability for participating in these 
crimes, an outstanding question is whether it is equally appropriate to excuse the business’s 
responsibility to respect and remedy impacts it participates in. The UNGP seems to suggest 
the answer is no: when a business causes or contributes to the impact, it bears responsibility 
to remedy that impact. Human rights due diligence might mitigate liability, but the 
responsibility to remediate exists unless the business’s operations were only ‘directly 
linked to’ the violation. Yet, in these operational environments, the business responsibility 
to respect cannot meaningfully operate independently of the state. The business cannot be 
merely ‘directly linked to’ a violation. Operating in these environments required active 
participation in gross and serious violations of IHRL and IHL.  
The experiences in TJ also indicate that the context is a factor not only for beneficial 
relationships, but sometimes for active engagement in crimes. The tribunals in Germany 
excused individual criminal liability for engaging in the use of slave labour, finding that 
the overarching context required defendants’ active participation. On the other hand, 
individuals were convicted of crimes when they failed to mitigate their involvement by 
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taking unnecessary advantage of the context. Similarly, the Colombian government’s land 
restitution process, and CAVR’s conclusions on the responsibilities of coffee and military 
businesses, similarly suggest that in situations of widespread and systematic violations of 
IHRL and IHL, the context may encourage businesses to take advantage of violations but 
it need not necessarily cause those violations. Finally, the nature of the South African 
apartheid regime meant that even those who merely benefitted from apartheid were 
expected to contribute to or participate in reparations efforts. This suggests that even 
passive involvement can incur some responsibility when the context is so oppressive that 
merely benefitting from violations also works to sustain them. This is echoed by the 
findings of those who have examined BHR in occupied Palestine. 
Finally, the experiences in TJ also suggest the limitations of relying on context to 
excuse a business’s conduct. Argentina’s junta engaged in widespread and systematic 
human rights violations, and businesses contributed to these violations. Yet, as with some 
of the Second World War cases, it was not the context that caused the business to engage 
with the violations. Instead, individual business leaders voluntarily supplied the military 
with names, equipment, food, and detention space. One could imagine a different finding 
by the Argentinian court if the military had forced the Ford leadership to engage in these 
crimes. This indicates that while some ‘complex environments’ create conditions within 
which the only means for a business to respect human rights is to leave the environment, 
not all complex environments require this. Similarly, the Nazi regime’s approach to 
enslavement and spoliation excused the responsibility of some business leaders, but others 
were convicted specifically because they willingly and knowingly furthered those 
violations beyond what the context required.  
In the discussion above, I did not need to consider how the severity of the activity 
might have impacted on a business’s responsibility. Yet, it is worth noting that in some 
circumstances, businesses might have only been ‘directly linked to’ a violation, but the 
context involved severe violations that took place over a long duration that meant the 
businesses likely slid from along the UNGP continuum from ‘directly linked to’ to 
‘contributing to’ the violations. This is perhaps clearest in the case of the South African 
and Colombian land displacements. The severity and duration of apartheid in South Africa, 
and the context of widespread and systematic displacement through the commission of war 
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crimes in Colombia, heightened the responsibility of businesses operating in those 
contexts. Where they might have only been ‘directly linked to’ to the displacements in 
another context, the knowledge of severe IHRL and IHL violations suggests their presence 
‘contributed to’ the violation. 
The problem with complex environments requires greater nuance than is provided 
in the UNGP. Seeking that nuance raises uncomfortable questions. The UNGP suggest that 
businesses operating in complex environments need only refrain from ‘exacerbat[ing] the 
situation.’177 But should this apply in contexts where the business’s presence means it is 
participating in–causing or contributing to–international criminal violations of IHRL and 
IHL, such as the use of slavery? While the context might excuse criminal responsibility, 
the UNGPs are framed around the lower threshold of a responsibility to respect human 
rights, meaning that all businesses are to refrain from harming human rights. In some 
complex environments, it appears the only way to do this is to leave the context. Yet, there 
are many small- and medium-sized enterprises indigenous to a context who cannot easily 
leave it. Forcing them to do so could limit economic opportunities for individuals and 
communities that are already in situations of vulnerability. It could also embolden regimes 
to monopolize economic opportunity in a manner that exacerbates an already difficult 
human rights situation. This would be contrary to the clear purpose of recognizing an 
independent business responsibility to respect human rights. One answer is therefore to 
excuse business failures to respect human rights in complex environments where they are 
required to participate in IHL and IHRL violations. This calls into question the claim that 
the responsibility to respect is the minimum threshold and expectation in all contexts. The 
alternative explanation, equally distressing, also carries with it the potential to undermine 
the UNGP’s status as the field’s current lodestar: perhaps it is inappropriate to expect all 
business to be equally bound by the UNGP at all times. While the UNGP allow for factors 
such as size to dictate the extent of business’s human rights due diligence or its response 
to harms it is ‘directly linked to’, the Guiding Principles still express a responsibility on all 
businesses to respect human rights at all times regardless of context. The strength and 
significance of this claim has directly impacted the current debate over the binding treaty. 
The remit of the treaty discussion was originally limited to transnational enterprises; the 
                                                 
177 UNGP (n 2) at Principle 23, Commentary.  
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July 2019 ‘Revised Draft,’ however, expanded the treaty’s impact to include all 
businesses.178  
In complex environments, applying the UNGP equally to businesses that are 
indigenous to the context and those that intentionally enter into it from outside seems ill-
advised. The former cannot be faulted for choosing the context in which it operates, 
although they may need to take measures within their control to limit their contributions. 
The latter, however, often have a clear choice as to whether they continue operations or 
shift to other engagements. This suggests that the UNGP’s understanding of the factors that 
a business should consider when determining how to respond to violations it is ‘directly 
linked to’ is incomplete; ‘opportunity’ or ‘control’ may be better indicators than ‘leverage’ 
in such circumstances. The complexity of this issue calls for interdisciplinary research on 
the political, social, and economic impacts of adding nuance to the UNGP.   
5. Conclusion 
 In this Chapter, I used the experience of TJ to inform the BHR approach to the 
business responsibility to respect. The findings of TJ mechanisms suggest that at times, the 
UNGP’s relational approach to the responsibility to respect is inappropriate. In a complex 
environment, the context, rather than individual relationships, can require a business to 
‘cause’ or ‘contribute to’ IHRL or IHL violations. In some circumstances, the business 
might have only been ‘directly linked to’ the violations but the severity and duration of 
these violations leads it to slide along the continuum to ‘contribute to’ the violations. Under 
the UNGP, this triggers a responsibility to provide remedies.  It is unfortunate that this is 
one of the first scholarly pieces to use TJ to examine the appropriateness of the UNGP’s 
expectations, and the first to do so when considering the particular issue of businesses 
operating in complex environments. While there have long been complaints about the 
UNGP’s approach to complex environments, these complaints have generally suggested 
that the UNGP do not go far enough in holding businesses accountable or giving them 
advice on operating in situations of armed conflict.179 There have also been complaints, 
                                                 
178 See above (n 20).  
179 See, e.g., Paul and Schönsteiner (n 14). 
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often dismissed by specialists, that the UNGP are more difficult for small- and medium-
sized enterprises to comply with. 180  It is only in introducing the experience of TJ 
mechanisms that the possibility arises that the UNGP asks too much of certain businesses 
operating in complex environments, but the burden stems not from the size of the company 
but its ability to choose the environment it operates in.  
The findings in this Chapter suggest that greater engagement with TJ can enhance 
the discourse within BHR. After examining the approach of the UNGP to business’s 
responsibilities to respect and remedy, I outlined the findings of several TJ mechanisms. 
In complex environments, businesses that can leave the context should. Yet, not all 
businesses can leave. National businesses are effectively unable to leave the context, but 
are also unable to avoid contributing to a violation. This conclusion led me to question 
whether the UNGP should be equally applied to ‘all businesses’ at all times and in all 
contexts. Greater scholarship is needed on this issue and the mere act of admitting that the 
question exists is itself a contribution, leaving me hesitant to proffer a firm answer. I offer 
two alternative answers, both of which call into question the universality of the UNGP and 
nether is particularly satisfying: either BHR excuses violations of the responsibility to 
respect that occur in complex environments where the business is required to participate in 
IHRL and IHL violations, or the field recognizes that the UNGP do not equally apply to 
all businesses at all times. Of these, I must hesitantly endorse the latter option. Recognizing 
that some businesses cannot, in some contexts, comply with the responsibility to respect 
human rights accurately reflects the findings of TJ mechanisms without justifying all 
ongoing business activity in complex environments. This approach should encourage 
businesses to consider their power, control, and specific human rights impacts, and to adopt 
‘conflict-sensitive business practices’ to mitigate their impacts.  
                                                 
180 In comments to the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dorothée Baumann-Pauly dismissed these 
concerns by noting that, in her experience, many small- and medium-sized enterprises comply more fully 
with the UNGPs, and struggled primarily with learning how to report their efforts accurately and completely. 
